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Many commentators have characterized Judge Markey and the United States Court
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FOUR OPINIONS BY CHIEF JUDGE MARKEY ON LIMITING PATENT
ENFORCEMENT
JOSEPH R. RE*

In the interest of time, I want to first shed some light on how this panel selected
our topics and the way we divided them up. This was really John's idea; that we
break up the topics as we have done so far. If we were to stop right now and break
for lunch, many of you who do not know Judge Markey would probably say, "Oh, he
was just a strong pro-patentee member of the Judiciary." I cringe every time I hear
people characterize Judge Markey that way (or other current Federal Circuit judges
such as Judge Newman, or Judge Rader). Other judges on the Court are viewed as
pro-patentee or pro-alleged infringer.
Judge Markey did not like that
characterization at all. He would say, "I'm not pro-patentee.
I'm pro-patent
system."1 "I'm pro-patent system" was one of his favorite lines, because he knew that
a strong patent system would have to have both strong rights as well as strong
defenses. So when John gave each of us our particular areas to cover-and to cover
Judge Markey's impact on patent litigation in an hour and a half is just physically
impossible-I was given the topic on limitations on the patent owner's enforcement
rights; any limitation I could think of. I agreed, so I picked four cases that I thought
typified Judge Markey's view that with every strong force there must be a strong and
equal reactionary force. I picked the four cases within minutes. I picked them and
then I read them carefully, and I realized there was a recurrent theme in all four of
the cases that I selected.
First of all, it just so happens that the patentee lost all four cases.2 Now, you
would not attribute that to Judge Markey right away unless you really studied and
understood Judge Markey better. The second thing I noticed, other than the first
case I will discuss-a declaratory judgment case called Arrowhead Industrial Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.3-the District Court was affirmed across the board. 4 That is
another aspect of Judge Markey that could get lost in all of this: Judge Markey
really tried to be very deferential to the District Court judges. I think that is
reflected throughout his cases. And the last thing I noticed is this recurrent theme
* Mr. Re is a law partner at Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, in Irvine, California.
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currently serves as the President of the Federal Circuit Bar Association and is a member of the
Federal Circuit Advisory Council. Mr. Re also served as a law clerk for Chief Judge Markey (198587) after graduating from St. John's University School of Law and Rutgers University, College of
Engineering.
1 See Rouget F. Henschel et al., ChiefJudge Howard T Markey OralHistoryProject, 1 J. FED.
CIR.HIST. Soc'y 47, 63 (2007).
2
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Markey,
C.J.) (holding that the patentee should not have succeeded in having a declaratory judgment action
dismissed); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Markey, C.J.) (affirming a finding of noninfringement); Gardco Mfg, Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820
F.2d 1209, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J.) (affirming a finding of unenforceability due to
inequitable conduct); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.)
(affirming finding of patent misuse on summary judgment).
3846 F.2d. 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Markey, C.J.).
4 Perkin-Elmer,822 F.2d at 1535 (affirming district court's holding); Gardco, 820 F.2d at 1215
(same); Senza-Gel, 803 F.2d at 669 (same).
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that we have been talking about today-that there should not be "such and such a
test." We all look to see if a test is satisfied. Judge Markey hated those kinds of
tests, and lo and behold, there are quotations in three of the four cases where Judge
Markey criticized a party for trying to amplify or hammer home a test.5 Let us take a
look at these cases quickly.
I only have four slides and this is the first one. This case, ArrowheadIndustrial
Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,6 came right to mind because it is quoted and cited so
often in today's cases I felt it deserved to be on my list of limitations on patent
enforcement.
Now, in this case-I really like this case for several reasons-the case was
dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. 7 Judge Markey, through the panel,
overturned that dismissal, and he explains in this beautifully written opinion-no, I
was not a law clerk at the time, but it still was a beautifully written opinion-that
one of the beautiful aspects of the Declaratory Judgment Act8 is to prevent the very
type of behavior that the patentee was engaging in here. 9 In this case, the patentee
was writing letters to customers of the alleged infringer.' 0 We all know, at least
those of you who are practicing patent law, how patentees can sometimes get carried
away writing to people downstream obviously to scare the customer not to buy from
the alleged infringer, but to buy from the patentee." Judge Markey called that the
5 See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer,822 F.2d at 1531 n.6; Gardo, 820 F.2d at 1215 ("Peerless' attempt to
subject the inequitable conduct conclusion to a rigid formulation is unavailing."); Senza-Gel, 803
F.2d at 670 n.14.
Perkin-Elmer's repeated assertions that the claimed and accused devices
perform substantially the same function and achieve substantially the same end
result are not helpful. That circumstance is commonplace when the devices are
sold in competition. That a claimed invention and an accused device may perform
substantially the same function and may achieve the same result will not make
the latter an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where it performs the
function and achieves the result in a substantially different way.
Perkin-Elmer,822 F.2d at 1531 n.6 (citations omitted).
The law of patent misuse in licensing need not look to consumer demand
(which may be non-existent) but need look only to the nature of the claimed
invention as the basis for determining whether a product is a necessary

concomitant of the invention or an entirely separate product. The laws of
antitrust violation, tailored for situations that may or may not involve a patent,
looks to to [sic] consumer demand test for determining product separability.
Senza -Gel,803 F.2d at 670 n.14.
6 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Markey, C.J.).
7 Id. at 733.
828 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
9 Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735.
After the [Declaratory Judgment] Act, those competitors [victimized by a
patentee's guerrilla-like scare-the-customer-and-run tactics] were no longer
restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential
liability for patent infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could
clear the air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.

Id.
10Id. at 733.

11See Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a patentee's notice to plaintiffs customers indicating that their unlicensed use of the
plaintiffs product would make them infringers gave rise to an actual controversy under the
Declaratory Judgment Act); Lisa A. Dolak, DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases:
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"scare-the-customer-and-run tacticl," all with his unit modifier. 12 He loved the unit
modifier. He used the hyphens.
He also looked at the case law and realized that the "reasonable apprehension of
suit" test-obviously, he does not like a test-is one suitable test. 13 Even under that
test, this case met the requirements for a case or controversy-and I think this case
now deserves rereading in light of the recent Supreme Court case in Medlmmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 14 MedImmune struck down the Federal Circuit's test looking
for a reasonable apprehension of suit, 15 and you will see how Judge Markey here
obviously was not a big fan of that test, but found that, even under this test, it was
16
satisfied.
That was one of Judge Markey's many skills. He would show how a judgment
could be reached without having to lay down an ironclad rule that he knew would be
subject to criticism no matter how it is applied in future cases. But this danse
macabrepassage is often quoted. He wrote:
This appeal presents a type of the sad and saddening scenario that led
to enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In
the patent version of that scenario, a patent owner engages in a danse
macabre,banishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword. Guerrillalike, the patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with
scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive environment
17
of the business community with uncertainty and insecurity.
Boy, this is just the first couple sentences of the opinion. It goes on and on, and
it states, "[m]ost, if not all, 'tests' employed in the art of judging arise in a particular
factual milieu. Hence they must be read, applied, and perhaps modified in light of
the facts of subsequent cases."'18 That is Judge Markey in a nutshell for you. And
sometimes when we would stand by his side and he would be writing something, he
would say, "Get a cite for this. Get a cite for that." Sometimes I would have to say,
"Judge, there is no authority for that." He would respond, "There is now!" 19
20
The next case I picked was Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Many of you may not know this case and may not know how it fits into the world of
Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer,38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 905-06
(1997) (noting that prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act's passage, patentees had the ability to
"effectively paralyz[e]" an alleged infringer's business dealings with threats of future action).
12 Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735.
13Id. at 736 (analyzing tests used in evaluating complaints for declaratory judgments in patent

cases).

14 549 U.S. 118
15 Id. at 137.

(2007).

16

Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 737 (applying the reasonable apprehension of suit test and noting
the difficulty in imagining "how a prudent Arrowhead executive confronted with the totality of
Ecolochem's conduct could resist the onset of a most reasonable apprehension that Arrowhead is
next.").
17
18

Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
Id. at 736.

19Joseph R. Re, ChiefJudge Howard T. Markey: Leadership Through Wit, 1 J. FED. CIR. HIST.
SOC'Y 13, 17 (2007).
20

822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J.).

[Special Issue 2009]

Four Opinions by Chief Judge Markey on Limiting
Patent Enforcement

37

patent law. But I was very familiar with this case because this case was decided
during my clerkship. I was able to see how things could snowball once somebody
takes a stand and shows some leadership. This was one such case.
In the mid 1980s, there was a great deal of controversy over the extent to which
a patentee could rely on the doctrine of equivalents, and after Judge Markey wrote
his 1983 decision Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United State, 2 1 there was some question on
whether the patentee had to show some corresponding element in the accused device
for each and every limitation of the claim. 22 That is, could a patentee rely on the
doctrine of equivalents even though there may be something missing in the accused
device that could possibly correspond to the claim? Or, must there be something the
patentee could point to that corresponds equivalently to each and every limitation of
23
the claim? We call that requirement the "All Elements Rule."
At the time of Hughes Aircraft, people thought that the Federal Circuit was
going the way of the patent holder and that the All Elements Rule was not a rigid
requirement. 24 Well, they got a dose of reality when Perkin-Elmercame out in 1987
when Judge Markey said, "yes, there must be something that corresponds," but he
did not say it like that. He would not talk like that. He would just say something
more like this:
[A] court may not, under the guise of applying the doctrine of equivalents,
erase a plethora of meaningful structural and functional limitations of the
claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding
infringement .... Though the doctrine of equivalents is designed to do
equity, and to relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity
requires, it is not designed to permit wholesale redrafting of a claim to cover
non-equivalent devices . ... 2
This was important. Judge Newman now writes a scathing dissent, longer than
the majority opinion itself, showing that Judge Markey was-she said, "rewriting the
21

717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.); see id. at 1364 (finding that the district court

erred by failing to "apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a whole").
22 See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 676-78 (1989) (describing the
Federal Circuit's struggles in the mid-1980s defining the doctrine of equivalents as either an
"element-by-element" test or a "'claim as a whole' (or 'entirety')" test).
23 Id. at 688.
Under the element-by-element approach, each element of the claim is examined to
determine whether it or its equivalent exists in the accused device. If there is no
correspondence, the accused device will not be deemed to operate in substantially
the same way as the claimed invention. There can be no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents under two conditions: if an element is missing completely
from the accused device and there is no equivalent of the missing element or if an
element has been changed in the accused device and the changed element does
not operate in substantially the same way.

Id.
24

See, e.g., Stephen G. Kalinchak, Obviousness and the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent

Law: Striving for Objective Criteria,43 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 603 (1994) ("[Sltatements by the
Federal Circuit that the 'as a whole' rule articulated in Hughes Aircraft has not been overruled also
cast doubt on the certainty of the element-by-element comparison.").
25 Perkin-Elmer,822 F.2d at 1532.
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law, ignoring precedent," and it goes on and on. 26 I remember bringing that dissent
to Judge Markey and saying, "Judge, Judge Newman's dissent has arrived. Would
you like to see it for any appropriate modifications?" He told me-I learned this
line-"It takes two to tango," meaning he was done. He already had the second vote
by the time that dissent came in. No changes were made to the majority opinion
whatsoever, and he would say, "Send it up the flag pole and see who salutes."
The reason why this was very significant at the time was the Federal Circuit's
2 7 was pending
en bane decision in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.
throughout my entire clerkship. For over two years that en bane case was pending.
Once Pennwalt came out, the new judge on the court was assigned the writing
assignment in Pennwalt, and that was Judge Jean Galloway Bissell. 28 Judge Bissell
wrote the majority opinion in the en bane Pennwalt decision and quoted at length
Perkin-Elmer,and Pennwaltbecame the law of the land.2 9 Lest there be any doubt
about that, Pennwalt'sAll Elements Rule was then affirmed by the Supreme Court
30
in the Warner-Jenkinson
case, and now we all take the All Elements Rule today as
31
patents.
of
law
basic black letter
My next case, Gardco Manufacturing,Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 32 is the case
John was kind enough to leave to me. Again, a strong right to trial by jury is only a
strong right if there is another right that would tell you otherwise. Judge Markey
here solidified the rule that there is no right to trial by jury on inequitable conduct. 33
That rule was unclear until 1987. The parties did not really argue over that rule too
much because, as we saw from the prior presentations, inequitable conduct is a
creature of equity and there is no right to trial by jury on equitable claims. 34 But the
issue here was much more interesting and significant; in this case the District Court
judge tried the inequitable-conduct issue first (before the legal claims of infringement
and validity) and found inequitable conduct. 35 So now on appeal, the patent owner
was arguing that his right to trial by jury was violated because there was overlap in
the legal and equitable claims. 36 Under the Supreme Court case law of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westove 3 7 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wooa 8-I am sure you are
26 Id.
at 1535-36 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The district court did not follow this court's
precedent in deciding the question of infringement. Nor does the majority, which has, in addition,
undertaken to rewrite this precedent.").
27 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
28 Id. at 932.
29 Id. at 935 (quoting Perkin-Elmer,822 F.2d at 1532-33).
30 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
31Id. at 40 ("The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objective inquiry on an
element-by-element basis."); see also 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04[1][b]
(indicating that the all elements approach remains legal precedent).
32 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J.).
33 Id. at 1212 ("The Seventh Amenment preserves to litigants the right to a jury trial where
legal rights are to be determined .... [H]owever, 'inequitable conduct' is derived from the doctrine of
unclean hands and is purely equitable in nature.").
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. ")(emphasis added).
35 Gardco,820 F.2d at 1210.
36 Id.
at 1213 (noting appellant's argument that the issues of patent infringement and
invalidity are "inherently intertwined" with the issue of inequitable conduct).
37359 U.S. 500 (1959).
38 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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probably learning those in your Civil Procedure classes-the right to trial by jury
trumps overlapping equitable claims. 39 Judge Markey explains in this opinion that
there really was only an overlap of evidence in this case, not an overlap of issues, and
41
affirmed the District Court. 40 Once again, affirming the District Court.
Again, in Gardco, he says, "Peerless' attempt"-Peerless being the patent
owner-"to subject the inequitable conduct conclusion to a rigid formulation is
unavailing." 42 Here we go again. Stop with the tests. Let us take a look at the facts
and evidence in your case and let us see how that looks in light of the real evidence
and stop looking for some test to hang onto to lead you to judgment. You see this
notion throughout Judge Markey's opinions.
Lastly, another limitation to the enforcement of the patent right, the patent
misuse doctrine has been one doctrine that has fallen in and out of favor for many,
many years. 43 It is subject to a lot of legal and scholarly debate, but you really do not
see that defense raised often in many cases. 44 So, it was rather surprising that, in a
matter of two years, Judge Markey had written three precedential opinions on the
45
subject of patent misuse, and in two of them, affirmed the finding of patent misuse.
Still think he is pro-patent holder?
The last case, Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart,46 really showed Judge Markey's
deference to the District Court and his true fairness though ruling against the patent
holder. 47 The facts of this case-I do not want to get into the details of the patent,

39 Id. at 479 (remanding for a trial by jury of factual issues because "the legal claims involved
in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination of respondents' equitable
claims."); Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11 ("This long-standing principle of equity dictates that
only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues
be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." (footnote omitted)).
40 Gardeo, 820 F.2d at 1213 ("[T]here is a fundamental difference between evidence and
issues.").
41 Id. at 1215.
42 Id
43

Robert J. Hoerner, The Declne (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal

Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 682-84 (2001) (tracking the Federal Circuit's application of the
patent misuse doctrine, which has narrowed to the point that an anti-competitive effect must be
proven).
44See, e.g., William J. Gilbreth, William H. Steinmetz & Richard G. Gervase, Jr., The Patent
Misuse Defense, Its ContinuedExpansion & Contraction,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/ANTITRUST
1993, at 489, 522-41 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser.
No. 365, 1993), available at WL, 365 PLI/Pat 489 (listing relevant decisions and placing them into
one or more of three different categories of antitrust cases); Patricia A. Martone & Richard M.
Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense-Does it Still Have Vitality?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTITRUST 2005, at 145, 155-59 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Ser. No. 832, 2005), available at WL, 832 PLI/Pat 145 (discussing the changes to the
patent misuse defense based on Federal Circuit decisions).
45Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J.) (answering a
certified question on interlocutory appeal that effectively affirmed holding of patent misuse); SenzaGel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.) (affirming holding of patent
misuse); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.)
(reversing holding of patent misuse).
46803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.).
47Id at 669 (affirming summary judgment of patent misuse).
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but I do want to mention that in this case, there was a trial. 48 The patent was found
valid and infringed by a jury.49 Judgment as a matter of law was denied post trial,
and then before final judgment was entered, there was a motion for leave to amend to
add the misuse defense.5 0 The motion for leave to amend was filed after the denial of
judgment as a matter of law and was granted.5 1 Then summary judgment was
granted for patent misuse.5 2 Judge Markey, through the Court, affirmed the leave to
amend, 53 and that was the predominant part of the briefing. He notes in this case
that there were 145 pages of briefing and nobody addressed the certified questions
that were presented to the Federal Circuit on appeal. 54 So, when he sees things like
that, he feels compelled to mention it in his opinions.
He affirmed the finding of misuse, affirmed the District Court's treatment of the
misuse doctrine in the certified
questions and did not mention any need to show an
"anti-competitive effect,"5 5 a comment that he made in an earlier case called
Windsurfing Intl, Inc. v. AMF, InC.56 After that case, some people thought misuse
required a showing of some anti-competitive effect similar to antitrust law.5 7 Judge
Markey made note of that in Windsurfing, but then you will notice how Judge
Markey does not note that in subsequent opinions, because, as he says in these
subsequent cases, misuse requires no effect, because requiring that would require
changes in the law by the United States Supreme Court.58 He was very deferential to
the Supreme Court, even though the Supreme Court cases were subject to a lot of
59
criticism on the subject of misuse.
So, those are my four cases. I hope I stayed within my time. As you can see,
generalizations are dangerous, tests are dangerous, and characterizations of Judge
Markey can be dangerous, because he was complicated and multifaceted. So be
careful. He was pro-patent system, not pro-patentee. Thank you.

48 Id. at 662 (indicating that the issues of patent validity and direct infringement were tried
separately before all other issues).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 662-63.
51 Id. at 663.
52Id
53 Id. at 667.
54 Id at 665 ("Incredibly, though they filed briefs totalling [sic] 145 pages, neither party
addresses certified question No. 1 in those briefs.").
55 Id. at 667-69.
56 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Markey, C.J.) ("To sustain a misuse defense
involving a licensing arrangement not held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme
Court, a factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain
competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market." (footnote omitted)).
57 See Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Aleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust
Violation, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10-11 (1989) (noting that patent misuse is intertwined with anti-trust
issues); Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency ofAntitrust Analysis for PatentMisuse, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 399, 418-19 (2003) (analyzing the affect Markey's decision in Windsurfing had in subsequent
patent misuse cases).
58 Senza-Gel, 803 F.2d at 665 n.5 ("We are bound, however, to adhere to existing Supreme
Court guidance in the area until otherwise directed by Congress or by the Supreme Court.").
59 See, e.g., J. Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 357 (1990) (arguing that the patent misuse doctrine should be eliminated).

